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1. INTRODUCTION 
The five employment law cases decided by the Supreme 
· Professor of Law, University of Richmond. 
*' Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchs berg Law Center 
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Court during the October 1999 Term bring to nineteen the 
total number of significant employment law cases decided by 
the Court during the last three terms.' The October 1997 
Term cases were marked by primary focus on employer 
liability, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' for 
sexual harassment by supervisors.' Primary focus during the 
1998 Term was on disability discrimination under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)4 and on the 
constitutionality of actions brought by private parties against 
states under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),' in light of 
the Eleventh Amendment0 sovereign immunity of the states.' 
An overview of the 1997 and 1998 Term employment law 
cases is provided in Section II of this article. 
The most important of the October 1999 Term 
employment law cases focused on the pretext-plus doctrine in 
employment discrimi-nation law and standards for ruling on 
motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of 
1. The six 1997 Term cases, discussed infra in Section II, are Oubre v. Entergy 
Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 {1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Seivs., Inc., 
523 U.S. 75 (1998); Gelssal v. Moore Medical Corp., 524 U.S. 74 (1998); Bragdon v. 
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). The eight 1998 Tenn cases, 
also discussed infra in Section II, are Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 
U.S. 70 (1998); Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999); 
West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999); Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 
526 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Albertson's,' Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 
555 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). The five 1999 Term cases, 
discussed infra in Sections III - VII, are Kimel v. State of Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 
S. Ct. 631 (2000); Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000); Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000); Pegram v. Herdrlch, 120 S. 
Ct. 2143 (2000); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 120 S. Ct. 
2180 (2000). 
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l to 2000e-l 7 (1994). 
3. An excellent analysis of employment law cases from the October 1997 Term 
is contained in Robert Belton, Employment Law: A Review of the 1997 Tenn Decisions 
of the Supreme Court, 2 EMPLOYEE Rrs. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 267 ( 1998). 
4. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101·12213 (1994). 
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
6. The Eleventh Amendment to the U. S. Constitution provides: "The Judicial 
Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. 
XI. 
7. An excellent analysis of employment law cases from the October 1998 Term 
is contained in Robert Belton, The Employment Law Decisions of the 1998-99 Tenn of 
the Supreme Court: a Review, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL 'y J. 183 (1999). 
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law.' The Court also considered the impact of Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity of the states on private law 
suits brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA)" against state government employers, 10 forced use 
of FLSA compensatory time by public employees, 11 liability of 
HMOs under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) 12 for mixed eligibility and treatment decisions, 13 and 
ERISA actions against nonfiduciaries. 14 
If one takes a three year view of the nineteen employment 
law cases, from the perspective of victories for employee 
plaintiffs versus victories for employer defendants, the results 
are mixed, but generally favor employees. Beneath the 
surface, one sees three voting patterns. First, two members 
of the Court, Justices Scalia and Thomas, usually joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, consistently vote in favor of 
employer interests unless they are constrained by Supreme 
Court precedent or controlling statutory language. Four 
members of the Court, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, 
and Stevens, generally support employees, although 
deviations from this pattern occur based upon the specifics of 
individual cases. The remaining two Justices, Kennedy and 
O'Connor, are unpredictable in their voting patterns. Alone, 
or in combination with each other, they determined the 
outcome in six of the nineteen employment law cases. 15 
II. OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES FROM THE 1997 AND 
1998TERMS 
The three most significant employment law cases from 
8. See Reeves, discused infra Section III. 
9. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-34 (1994). 
10. See Kimel, discussed infra Section IV. 
11. See Christensen, discussed infra Section V. 
12. 29 u.s.c. §§ 1001-1467 (1994). 
13. See Pegram, discussed infra Section VI. 
14. See Hanis, discussed infra Section VII. Three October 1999 Term 
nonemployment law cases, with employment law impact, are discussed in Section 
VIII. The cases are Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000) (RICO not violated by 
termination of employment in retaliation for reporting RICO violations); Cortez Byrd 
Chips, Inc. V. Bill Harbert Construction Co., 120 S.Ct. 1331 (2000) (Federal 
Arbitration Act venue issues); and Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United 
States ex-rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858 {2000} (qui tam actions by state employees 
against state agencies). 
15. Oubre, Bragdon, West, Kolstad, Alden, and Kimel. 
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the 1997 Term dealt with Title VII challenges to sexual 
harassment. The frrst two, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth16 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 17 established 
standards for determining if employers are vicariously liable 
for sexual harassment by supervisors. The Court held that if 
a "tangible employment action" 18 is taken (such as discharge, 
demotion, or undesirable reassignment), there will be 
vicarious liability. If no tangible employment action is taken, 
an employer may avoid vicarious liability by proving that it 
acted reasonably "to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior," 19 and by proving that "the 
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of 
any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise .... "20 
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented from the employee-
protective approach of the majority in Ellerth and Faragher. If 
no tangible employment action is taken against the employee, 
these two justices would impose liability only when an 
employer is negligent. Justice Thomas expressed this view as 
follows: "[A]bsent an adverse employment consequence, an 
employer cannot be held vicariously liable if a supervisor 
creates a hostile work environment. "21 
In the third sexual harassment case, Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 22 Justice Scalia, writing for 
a unanimous Court, concluded that same-sex sexual 
harassment violates Title VII. Justice Scalia relied upon 
Supreme Court precedent holding that there may be unlawful 
discrimination even if a perpetrator is of the same race or 
gender as the victim." In Oncale, Justice Scalia wrote: "If our 
precedents leave any doubt on the question, we hold today 
that nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of 
discrimination 'because of . . . sex' merely because the 
16. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
17. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
18. Burlington. 524 U.S. at 744. 
19. Id. at 747. 
20. Id. at 765. 
21. Faragher. 524 U.S. at 810. 
22. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
23. Justice Scalia cited Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara 
County. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). with respect to sex. and Castaneda v. Partida. 430 U.S. 
482 {1977), with respect to race. 
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plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting 
on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex. "24 
Another significant case from the 1997 Term provided 
encouragement for those who seek expansive protection for 
disabled workers under the ADA. In Bragdon v. Abbott," 
Justice Kennedy controlled the outcome by joining the 
Breyer-Ginsburg-Souter-Stevens group. The Court held that 
HN infection is a disability under the ADA because it causes 
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one of the major life activities of [an] individual. "26 The Court 
discussed attacks by HN on immune and lymphatic systems, 
resulting in physical impairments that substantially limit. 
among other things, a person's major life activitiy of 
reproduction. The Court stated: "Testimony from [Sidney 
Abbott] that her HN infection controlled her decision not to 
have a child is unchallenged."27 Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and O'Connor, dissented 
and concluded that Sidney Abbott "failed to demonstrate that 
any of her major life activities were substantially limited by 
her HN infection."2 ' 
The two remaining employment law cases from the 1997 
Term reflect the pattern in which Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, favor employers 
when this does not require rejection of clear statutory text or 
Supreme Court precedent. In the first of these cases, Geissa[ 
v. Moore Medical Corp.,2 ' Justice Souter, writing for a 
unanimous Court, interpreted a portion of the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA),30 which 
amended ERISA. Justice Souter concluded that the "plain 
meaning"31 of the text required that a former employee retain 
his or her right to continued medical coverage under the 
former employer's medical insurance plan, even if the former 
24. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. 
25. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). The quoted text ls one of three ADA definitions 
of disability. The other two are having "a record of such an impairment" and "being 
regarded as having such impairment." Id. 
27. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641. 
28. Id. at 661 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
29. 524 U.S. 74 (1998). 
30. 29 u.s.c. §§ 1161-68 (1994). 
31. Geissal, 524 U.S. at 82. 
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employee was covered under another medical insurance plan 
at the time the employment relationship ended. Most lower 
courts had held that coverage under another plan at the time 
employment terminated precluded a right to continue under 
the employer's plan, unless there was a "significant gap"'2 in 
coverage between the employer's plan and the other plan." 
Justice Souter's opinion for the Court considered the 
complicated· factors involved in determining if there is a 
significant gap in coverage, and concluded that "the required 
judgment is so far unsuitable for courts that we would expect 
a clear mandate before inferring that Congress meant to foist 
it on the judiciary."34 Because of this policy concern and the 
plain text of COBRA, all members of the Court joined Justice 
Souter's opinion. 
The remaining case from the 1997 Term, Oubre v. Entergy 
Operations, Inc.,35 also protected statutory rights of 
employees. A majority of six, consisting of Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy 
and O'Connor, strictly applied statutory requirements for 
waiver and release of ADEA rights. These requirements were 
added to the ADEA in 1990 by the Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act (OWBPA).36 They were designed to insure that 
waivers and releases of ADEA rights by employees are 
knowing and voluntary. The majority concluded that an 
employee need not "tender back" the consideration received 
for a waiver and release of ADEA claims, as a precondition to 
bringing suit under the ADEA. At the same time, because it 
might be unjust for a plaintiff to retain the original 
consideration and also receive a remedy in the ADEA action, 
the majority noted that the employer may have "claims for 
restitution, recoupment, or setoff against the employee."
37 
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented, with Chief Justice 
32. Id. at 85. 
33. See, e.g., National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Atlanta, 
Inc .. 929 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991); Brock v. Prirnedlca, Inc., 904 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 
1990); but see Lutheran Hosp. of Indiana, Inc. v. Business Men's Assurance Co., 51 
F.3d 1308 (7th Cir. 1995). 
34. Geissal, 524 U.S. at 87. 
35. 522 U.S. 422 (1998). 
36. Pub. L. No. 101-433, Title II, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
621-34) (1994)). 
37. Oubre, 522 U.S. at 428. 
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Rehnquist joining the dissent of Justice Thomas. They would 
have required, "as a condition precedent to suit, that a 
plaintiff return the consideration received in exchange for a 
release .... "38 The dissent would have limited the ability of 
many plaintiffs to bring suit for ADEA violations because 
these plaintiffs, 'prior to bringing suit, already would have 
spent that which they received in return for their waiver and 
release of ADEA claims.3° 
The Court interpreted the ADA in three interrelated cases 
during the 1998 Term, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc . .4° 
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,41 and Albertson's, Inc., v. 
Kirkingburg.'2 The Court held that a determination that an 
individual is disabled under the ADA requires an 
individualized determination of the extent to which a 
particular physical impairment limits a major life activity of 
that individual." It further held that corrective or mitigating 
measures must be considered in determining if there is a 
substantial limitation of a major life activity of an individual. 
Six members of the Court, including Justices Ginsburg and 
Souter, joined the opinion of Justice O'Connor in Sutton. The 
case involved twin sisters with severe myopia who were 
denied global pilot positions with United Air Lines, even 
though their corrected vision was 20/20. The Court 
concluded that they were not disabled under the ADA 
because they were not substantially limited in a major life 
activity. Their ability to see was not substantially limited 
because their vision was corrected. They also were not 
limited in the major life activity of working because, although 
disqualified by their vision from being global pilots, they 
could hold other pilot positions. 
In Murphy, a truck mechanic was fired by UPS because of 
medically controlled high blood pressure. As in Sutton, there 
was a physical impairment, but not one that substantially 
38. Id. at 437 {Thomas, J., dissenting). 
39. On December 11, 2000, the EEOC published a rule based on Oubre which 
dealt with the tender back issue and related OWBPA waiver and release issues. 
Waivers of Rights and Claims: Tender Back of Consideration, 65 Fed. Reg. 77437 
(2000) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1625) (effective Jan. 10, 2001). 
40. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
41. 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
42. 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
43. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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limited a major life activity. Medication permitted Murphy to 
function normally in his major life activities, and he was not 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working 
because, although disqualified from mechanic positions that 
required driving the trucks, Murphy could perform other 
mechanic jobs. 
In Albertson's, a truck driver was fired because he 
suffered from amblyopia, which causes monocular vision. 
The Court held that mitigating measures must be taken into 
account in determining if he was disabled under the ADA, 
and an individualized determination must be made to 
determine if his medical condition substantially limits one of 
his major life activities. These mitigating measures included 
changes within the individual's own body to compensate for 
the impairment. 
The majority opinions by Justice O'Connor in Sutton and 
Murphy, and by Justice Souter in Albertson's, leave the 
impression that the justices made a genuine attempt to 
discern the actual intent of Congress. In a concurring 
opinion in Sutton, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the intent 
of Congress was to "restrict the ADA's coverage to a confined, 
and historically disadvantaged class."44 Because of this, she 
agreed that the ADA "does not reach the legions of people 
with correctable disabilities.'"' 
The members of the Court agreed in their reasoning and 
result in another case involving the ADA, Cleveland v. Policy 
Management Systems Corp.46 Cleveland involved the defense 
of judicial estoppel, which prevents "a party from 
contradicting previous declarations made during the same or 
a later proceeding if the change in position would adversely 
affect the proceeding or constitute a fraud on the court. "47 
The doctrine was applied by some federal courts in cases in 
which a plaintiff applied for Social Security Disability 
Insurance ("SSDI") benefits under the Social Security Act,48 as 
a disabled person unable to work, and subsequently filed an 
44. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
45. Id. at 494. 
46. 526 U.S. 795 (1999). 
47. BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY517 (7th ed. 1999). 
48. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1994 & Supp. !I 1996). 
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ADA action claiming to be a disabled person able to perform 
the essential functions of a job. The apparent inconsistency 
between these two positions led many lower courts to dismiss 
the ADA actions. The Court's unanimous opinion in 
Cleveland, written by Justice Breyer, relied upon the 
differences in the definitions of disability under the Social 
Security Act and the ADA. Reasonable accommodation is not 
taken into consideration under the Social Security Act in 
determining if an individual is able to work. The Court 
concluded that judicial estoppel does not apply in this 
situation, although a plaintiff who claims to be disabled for 
SSDI purposes and subsequently files an ADA action "cannot 
simply ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of 
the earlier SSDI total disability claim. Rather, she must 
proffer a sufficient explanation."49 The Court thus was 
unanimous in a decision that gave a benefit both to 
employers and employees, and was based upon a straight-
forward reading of statutory text. 
The Court also was unanimous in a case involving 
mandatory arbitration of employment disputes, Wright 
v.Universal Maritime Service Corp. 50 Wright involved a 
mandatory arbitration clause contained in a collective 
bargaining agreement. The employer sought to force Wright 
to submit his ADA claim to binding arbitration rather than 
proceed in federal court. The Court's decision focused on the 
power of a union to bargain away its members' right to a 
judicial forum for resolution of ADA claims (and other 
statutory claims). In a tantalizing opinion for the Court, that 
ultimately left more unresolved than resolved, Justice Scalia 
established a "clear and unmistakable"51 waiver standard for 
a "union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to a 
judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination."
52 
The next to last sentence in the opinion was as follows: "We 
do not reach the question whether such a waiver would be 
enforceable."53 The Scalia-Thomas-Rehnquist group may 
have declined to use this case as an opportunity to advocate 
49. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806. 
50. 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
51. Jd. at 80. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 82. 
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support for binding arbitration of employment disputes 
because of a reluctance to overrule existing Supreme Court 
precedent. A decision authorizing clear and unmistakable 
waivers by a union of its members' rights to a judicial forum 
for statutory employment claims would conflict, at least in 
part, with the Court's 1974 decision in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.54 In Alexander, the Court considered a provision 
in a collective · bargaining agreement that required union 
members to submit disputes to binding arbitration. The 
Court held that "there can be no prospective waiver of an 
employee's rights under Title VII. "55 
The importance of the binding arbitration issues raised 
by Wright warrants an update on the post-Wright decisions by 
lower federal courts. The Fourth Circuit, the only circuit to 
allow waivers before Wright, decided several cases indicating 
what it would recognize as a waiver. In Carson v. Giant Food, 
Inc.,56 the Fourth Circuit read Wright as establishing two 
methods of waiver that would meet the requisite standard. 
First, the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause 
could provide specifically that employees agree to arbitrate all 
federal claims arising out of employment. Alternatively, 
where the arbitration clause applies to all disputes, or all 
disputes concerning the interpretation of the agreement, the 
statutory discrimination laws must be incorporated in the 
collective bargaining agreement in order for there to be a 
waiver. 57 A general anti-discrimination r~quirement will not 
suffice. 58 In Brown v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc,59 the Fourth 
Circuit expanded upon Carson and held that contractual 
language which "may parallel, or even parrot, the language of 
federal anti-discrimination statutes,"60 does not explicitly 
incorporate the statutes into the agreement. The court 
explained, "There is a significant difference, and we believe a 
legally dispositive one, between an agreement not to commit 
discriminatory acts that are prohibited by law and an 
54. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
55. Id at 51. 
56. 175 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1999). 
57. Id. at 331-32. 
58. Id. at 332. 
59. 183 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1999). 
60. Id. at 322. 
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agreement to incorporate, in toto, the antidiscrimination 
statutes that prohibit those acts."61 Courts in other 
jurisdictions have followed Carson and, with a few exceptions, 
have declined to find waivers of the right to litigate in a 
judicial forum.62 The Wright waiver standard has been 
applied to state· discrimination law claimS63 and constitutional 
claims.64 One district court in the Fourth Circuit has found a 
waiver based on Carson and Brown.6' While the language of 
the agreement is not quoted in the case, the court described 
the language as containing an agreement "not to discriminate 
against any employee because of gender and to abide by Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'"6 The court also wrote: 
"Section XX of the CBA requires that any grievance against 
Defendant for discrimination must be submitted to 
arbitration."67 The case was not appealed and it is difficult to 
tell from the court's description of the language whether it 
met either of the requirements articulated in Carson. A 
recent decision from the Eastern District of New York gave 
preclusive effect to an arbitrator's decision denying a sexual 
harassment grievance, thereby granting summary judgment 
on the plaintiffs' Title VII and state law claims.6' The court 
6L Id. 62. See, e.g .. Rogers v. New York Univ .• 220 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that 
union waivers of individual rights are unenforceable, but even if they are enforceable 
after Wright, there is no waiver where there is no specific incorporation of the 
statute, by name or citation, and no contractual commitment to comply with the 
statute.); Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co .. 215 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding no 
waiver where the collective bargaining agreement did not mention the statute and 
the employee's grievance alleging discrimination did not waive the right to litigate in 
a judicial forum. even though the arbitrator and the employee discussed the statute); 
Quint v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co .. J 72 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding no waiver where 
there was no contractual mention of the statute). 
63. See Vasquez v. Superior Court. 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, found a waiver of a state 
statutory claim where the arbitration clause covered "claims arising out of or under 
this {collective bargaining agreement} or the employee's emploYJilent, including but 
not limited to any EEOC, ADA, ADEA or other statutory claims ... . "Torres v. Four 
Seasons Hotel, 715 N.Y.S. 2d 28, 29 (App. Div. 2000). 
64. See Schumacher v. Souderton Area Sch. Dist., 163 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2461 
(E.D. Pa. 2000). 65. See Safrit v. Cone Mills. 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2974 (M.D.N.C. 1999). 
66. Id. at 2975. 
67. Id. 68. Clarke v. UFJ, Inc .. 164 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2388 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). Since the 
decision, however, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its earlier decision that union 
waivers of employee rights to litigate statutory claims are unenforceable. Rogers v. 
188 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPWYMENT POUCY JOURNAL [Vol. 4: 177 
concluded that there was a clear and unmistakable 
agreement to arbitrate statutory claims based on a 
contractual commitment to end sexual harassment, which 
included a definition drawn in part from Supreme Court Title 
VII cases and language stating that grievances under the 
sexual harassment clause will be handled with speed and 
confidentiality. In contrast to other courts, the New York 
court did not require express incorporation of the statute, but 
found a waiver based upon the use of language from cases 
interpreting the statute. 
During the 1998 Term, in Alden v. Maine.6" the Court 
applied the Eleventh Amendment and related principles of 
sovereign immunity to block enforcement of the overtime 
compensation provisions of the FLSA against state agencies 
through private law suits. Although the Eleventh 
Amendment previously was held only to block private law 
suits brought against states in federal court, in Alden the 
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment, and related state 
sovereign immunity principles, also shield an unconsenting 
state from being sued in state court. The decision in Alden 
demonstrates the traditional voting patterns of the justices in 
employment law cases. A majority of five was formed when 
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor joined Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens were in dissent. Alden and 
other Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity cases 
led to the 1999 Term decision in Kimel v. State of Florida 
Board of Regents,'0 in which the ADEA was held to be 
unenforceable against state agency employers through private 
actions by state employees in federal court. Kimel is 
discussed in Section N. 
The remaining two employment cases from the 1998 
Term interpreted the text of Title VII. In West v. Gibson,71 the 
Court first considered language added to Title VII in 1972 
that authorizes the EEOC to use an administrative procedure 
to provide "appropriate remedies" for employment 
New York Univ., 220 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000). 
69. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
70. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
71. 527 U.S. 212 (1999). 
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discrimination against federal government employees." The 
Court then considered the Compensatory Damages 
Amendment Act of 1991,73 which provided for compensatory 
damage awards for victims of intentional employment 
discrimination, including victims who are employees of the 
federal government. The Court interpretated both statutes 
and concluded that the EEOC has power to award 
compensatory damages to federal government employees. 
Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court was joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, O'Connor, Souter, and Stevens, with the 
participation of Justice O'Connor making this the majority 
view. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, 
and Thomas were in dissent. 
The Court also interpreted the text of Title VII in Kolstad 
v. American Dental Association, 74 which involved the standard 
to be used for awards of punitive damages under Title VII, as 
amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act. The statutory 
language provides for an award of punitive damages if an 
employer acts "with malice or with reckless indifference to the 
federally protected rights"" of an employee. Some lower 
courts construed this language to mean that egregious 
lnisconduct is required. The opinion for the Court by Justice 
O'Connor did not accept this stringent test for awards of 
punitive damages, and held that "[t]he terms 'malice' or 
'reckless indifference' pertain to the employer's knowledge 
that it may be acting in violation of federal law, not its 
awareness that it is engaging in discrilnination." 76 This 
portion of her opinion, supportive of employees, was joined by 
seven members of the Court, with dissents by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas who preferred an eggregious 
lnisconduct standard. Justice O'Connor then dramatically 
lilnited employer vicarious liability for punitive damages on a 
basis that was not briefed by the parties. Joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and 
Thomas, she wrote, "Recognizing Title VII as an effort to 
promote prevention as well as remediation ... we agree that 
72. 42 USC§ 2000e-16[bl(l994). 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 19811(a)(l)[l994). 
74. 527 U.S. 526 (1999). 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a[bl(I) (1994). 
76. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535. 
-----, 
I 
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an employer may not be vicariously liable for the 
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents 
where these decisions are contrary to the employer's 'good-
faith efforts to comply with Title VII."'77 Justice Stevens, joined 
by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter, dissented from the 
failure of the Court to remand the case for trial on the 
punitive damages issue. They wrote, "The absence ofbriefmg 
or meaningful argument by the parties makes this Court's 
gratuitous decision to volunteer an opinion on this nonissue 
particularly ill advised."78 This overview of the 1997 and 1998 
Term employment law cases provides context for a review of 
the 1999 Term decisions. 
III. PRETEXT-PLUS DOCTRINE, MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW - Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 
Employees were the victors in Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Products, Inc.79 The decision rejected pretext-plus 
doctrine and limited the ability of federal judges to grant 
motions for summary judgment and motions for judgment as 
a matter of law in employment discrimination cases. 
The pretext-plus portion of the Court's decision confirms 
the continuing validity of three earlier Supreme Court 
decisions that established a workable method for proving 
individual disparate treatment cases through the use of 
circumstantial evidence.8° The first of these cases, McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green. 81 held that a plaintiff in a racial 
77. Id. at 545. 
78. Id. at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
79. 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000). 
80. The three cases, McDonnell Douglas Corp.v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); 
Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 {1981); and St. Mary's 
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 {1993), were based upon Title VII, whereas Reeves 
is an ADEA case. The parties in Reeves did not dispute the applicability of the 
holdings of the three cases to the ADEA and the Court "assume[d], arguendo, that 
the McDonnell Douglas framework is fully applicable ... " 120 S.Ct. at 2105. Lower 
courts in all circuits have applied McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and Hicks to ADEA 
cases, and the Supreme Court earlier "assumeldl" that McDonnell Douglas applies to 
ADEA cases. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 
(1996). In O'Connor, the Court reviewed a decision of the Fourth Circuit that applied 
McDonnell Douglas to an ADEA action and listed cases from the other eleven circuits 
in which McDonnell Douglas had been applied in ADEA cases. Id. at 309 n2. 
81. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
fl 
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discrimination Title VII action may establish a prima facie 
case 
by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that 
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the 
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his 
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his 
rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's 
qualification." 
The Court's opinion also provided a basis for applying the 
basic approach of McDonnell Douglas, with appropriate 
variations, to individual disparate treatment claims involving 
other aspects of the employment process, such as promotions 
and terminations, 83 and other categories of discrimination 
covered by Title VII, such as national origin and gender.•• 
Establishment of a· prima facie case shifts to the 
defendant employer a burden "to articulate some legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."85 The 
plaintiff then must "be afforded a fair opportunity to show 
that the [defendant's] stated reason for [the plaintiffs] 
rejection was in fact pretext."86 
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 87 
the Court clarified two aspects of McDonnell-Douglas. First, 
the Court made it clear that the defendant employer's burden 
is one of production, not persuasion. The Court explained 
this as follows: 
The burden that shifts to the defendant ... is to rebut the 
presumption of discrimination ... The defendant need not 
persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the 
proferred reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's 
evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it 
82. Id. at 802. 
83. See id. at 802 n.13 (''The facts will vary in Title VII cases, and the 
specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not 
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations."). 
84. Title VII provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin ... 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). 
85. McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at802. 
86. Id. at 804. 
87. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
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discrimillated against the plaintiff. To accomplish this, the 
defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction 
of admissible evidence, the reason for the plaintiffs 
rejection. 88 
The second part of McDonnell Douglas that was clarified 
by Burdine relates to proof of pretext by the plaintiff. The 
Court held that a plaintiff can demonstrate pretext in either 
of two ways, "either directly by persuading the court that a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or 
indirectly by showing that the employer's proferred 
explanation is unworthy of credence."89 
The Burdine pretext stage was the focus of attention in St. 
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.90 In Hicks, the Court 
emphasized that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains 
on the plaintiff at all times, 91 and that the prima facie case "is 
no longer relevant"92 and "simply drops out of the picture,"93 
once the defendant has met its burden of production. The 
Court then focused on that portion of Burdine that held that 
pretext can be proven by "showing the employer's proferred 
explanation is unworthy of credence."94 Justice Scalia's 
opinion in Hicks held that this proof of pretext does not 
"[compel) judgment for the plaintiff'95 because "nothing in law 
would permit us to substitute for the required fmding that 
the employer's action was the product of unlawful 
discrimination, the much different (and much lesser) fmding 
that the employer's explanation of its action was not 
believable. "95 Instead, "the trier of fact proceeds to decide the 
ultimate question: whether plaintiff has proven 'that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated against [him)' because 
of his race ... "97 This does not mean, however, that proof of 
pretext is never sufficient, by itself, to prove discrimination, 
nor does it mean that the evidence used to create a prima 
88. Id. at 254-55 {citation and footnote omitted}. 
89. Id. at 256. 
90. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
91. Id. at 507. 
92. Id. at 510. 
93. Id. at 511. 
94. Id. at 517, quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. 
95. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. 
96. Id. at 514-15. 
97. Id. at 511, quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. 
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facie case and prove pretext is irrelevant. Justice Scalia 
wrote: 
The factfmder·s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the 
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a 
suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of 
the prirr\a facie case, suffice to show intentional 
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's prof erred 
reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact 
of intentional discrimination .... 
98 
Justice Scalia's pretext discussion in Hicks gave rise to 
the pretext-plus doctrine. It also led to Reeves, and the 
pretext-plus doctrine's demise. 
The pretext-plus doctrine, as applied by the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Reeves and by some federal courts in 
other cases,'' provides that a prtma facie case plus proof of 
pretext alone do not permit a judgment for the plaintiff. 
Instead, additional evidence of intentional discrimination is 
required. For example, in Reeves the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed a lower court judgment for the plaintiff 
because the additional evidence, beyond that which 
established the prima facie case and proved pretext, was 
insufficient in the appellate court's view to support a 
judgment for the plaintiff. 100 Proof of pretext plus other 
credible evidence was required. Justice O'Connor described 
the lower court's error as follows: "[B]ecause a prima facie 
case and sufficient evidence to reject the employer's 
explanation may permit a finding of liability, the Court of 
Appeals erred in proceeding from the premise that a plaintiff 
must always introduce additional, independent evidence of 
discrimination." 101 
Roger Reeves was terminated at the age of fifty-seven 
after forty years of employment by Sanderson Plumbing 
Products. In his ADEA action, he established a prima facie 
case by proving: (1) he was in the ADEA protected class of 
98. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. 
99. See, e.g., Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ .. 193 F.3d 219, 230 (4th Cir. 1999) 
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1243 (2000); Gillins v. Berkeley Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 148 
F.3d 413, 416 (4th Cir. 1998); Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp .. 119 F.3d 330, 337 
(5th Cir. 1997); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co .. 6 F.3d 836, 842-43 (1st Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018 (1994). 
100. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 693 (5th Cir. 
1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000). 
101. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2109. 
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persons forty years of age or older, (2) he was qualified for his 
manufacturtng supervisor position, (3) he was terminated, 
and (4) Sanderson successively hired three other people in 
their thirties for the position. 102 Sanderson met its burden of 
producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its 
action, "by offertng evidence sufficient for the trier of fact to 
conclude that petitioner was fired because of his failure to 
maintain accurate attendance records."103 Reeves then 
introduced evidence, believed by the jury, that this 
explanation was pretextual, and offered additional evidence of 
intentional age discrimination. This additional evidence 
included evidence that Reeves was treated more harshly than 
similarly situated younger employees, and that age-based 
statements were made about him by the supervisor who 
recommended his termination, specifically that "he 'was so 
old [he] must have come over on the Mayflower,"' 104 and "that 
he 'was too damn old to do [his] job. ""05 
Applying the pretext-plus doctrine, the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals considered but was unconvinced by the additional 
evidence and disregarded the evidence that established the 
prima facie case and proved pretext. Justice O'Connor 
described the appellate court's decision as follows: 
[T]he Court of Appeals ignored the evidence supporting 
petitioner's piima facie case and challenging respondent's 
explanation for its decision. The Court confined its review 
of evidence favoring petitioner to that evidence showing that 
Chestnut had directed derogatory, age-based comments at 
petitioner, and that Chestnut had singled out petitioner for 
harsher treatment than younger employees. It is therefore 
apparent that the court believed that only this additional 
evidence of discrimination was relevant to whether the 
jury's verdict should stand. That is, the Court of Appeals 
proceeded from the assumption that a piima facie case of 
discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for the 
trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, is insufficient as 
a matter of law to sustain a jury's finding of intentional 
discrimination. In so reasoning, the Court of Appeals 
misconceived the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs 
who attempt to prove intentional discrimination through 
102. Id. at 2106. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 2110. 
105. Id. 
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indirect evidence. 106 
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Reeves thus 
rejected the pretext-plus doctrine, and confirmed that "a 
plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence 
to fmd that the employer's asserted justification is false, may 
permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer 
unlawfully discriminated."10' She provided this rationale for 
the Court's conclusion: 
Jn appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can 
reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the 
employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory 
purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general 
principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to 
consider a pariy's dishonesty about a material fact as 
"affirmative evidence of guilt." Moreover, once the 
employer's jus1;ification has been eliminated, discrimination 
may well be the most likely alternative explanation, 
especially since the employer is in the best position to put 
forth the actual reason for its decision.
108 
The Court also noted that "there will be instances where, 
although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and 
set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's 
explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the 
action was discriminatory." 109 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg discussed 
circum-stances in which additional evidence will be necessary 
for plaintiffs "to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law,"u0 and anticipated "that such circumstances will be 
uncommon," 111 because "the jury is entitled to treat a party's 
dishonesty about a material fact as evidence of culpability."
112 
A recent case in which summary judgment was granted 
to the defendant, even though the plaintiff established his 
prima facie case and a jury might have concluded that the 
employer's explanation was pretextual, is Schnabel v. 
Abramson.113 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote: 
106. Id. at 2108 (citations omitted). 
107. Id. at 2109. 
108. Id. at 2108-09 (citations omitted}. 
109. Id. at 2109. 
110. Id. at 2112. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 113. 232 F.3d 83 {2d Cir. 2000). Schnabel, a sixty year old attorney, was 
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[W]e hold that after Reeves, a court may, in appropriate 
ctrcumstances, still grant a defendant's motion for 
summary judgment-or judgment as a matter of law-on 
an ADEA claim when a plaintiff has offered only a prima 
facie case along with evidence that the defendant's stated 
nondiscriminatory reasons for an adverse employment 
action are pretextual. 114 
The court explained that "the Supreme Court's decision 
in Reeves clearly mandates a case-by-case approach, with a 
court exaniining the entire record to determine whether the 
plaintiff could satisfy his 'ultimate burden of persuading the 
trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff."' 115 The court upheld summary 
judgment for the defendant because "plaintiff has presented 
no evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could base 
the conclusion that age was a determinative factor in 
defendant's decision to fire him."115 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals described the impact of 
Reeves in a similar manner, in Fite v. Digital Equipment 
Corp. 117 The court wrote: 
Jn Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., the Supreme 
Court made clear that 'the falsity of the employer's 
explanation' may permit the jury to infer a discriminatory 
motive but does not compel such a finding .... Obviously 
whether in a particular case a prima facie showing of 
discrimination and the disbelieved pretextual explanation 
make a stronger or weaker case for the plaintiff depends 
very heavily on the facts. 118 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon Reeves 
in Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 119 and reversed a trial court 
summary judgment in favor of an employer because of 
evidence that established the prima facie case and proved 
terminated from his investigator position with a county legal aid society, and was 
replaced by a younger, former employee with a better employment record. Schnabel 
was fired by the same Chief Attorney who hired him three years earlier. No additonal 
evidence of age discrimination was available to Schnabel. 
114. Id. at 91. 
115. Id. at 90. 
116. Id. See also James v. New York Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 
2000) (upholding a trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment 
because "James's evidence was insufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find 
that age discrimination was the reason for his discharge . .. "). 
117. 232 F.3d 3 (!st Cir. 2000). 
118. Id. at 7 (citations omitted). 
119. 225 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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pretext, combined with additional "evidence [consisting] 
prinlarilY of disparaging age-related remarks made to Fisher 
and other Pharmacia employees by members of Pharmacia's 
management."120 The same court, again relying on Reeves, 
upheld the trial court's grant of a motion for judgment as a 
matter of law in Tatom v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 121 because "no 
rational jury could find that Tatom's suspension was the 
result of intentional discrimination based on age."
122 
These 
post-Reeves decisions leave unclear the extent to which some 
lower courts may limit the impact of the Reeves pretext-plus 
holding by reviewing evidence to determine if a reasonable 
jury could find for the plaintiff. 
The procedural holdings of the Court in Reeves are as 
important for employment litigation as the Court's rejection of 
pretext-plus doctrine. The procedural holdings apply not just 
to employment law cases, but to civil litigation in general. 
123 
They establish standards to control federal district court 
judges when they rule on motions for judgment as a matter of 
law, under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and motions for summary judgment, under Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The standards articulated 
in Reeves will curb the current practice of many federal 
judges who, when dealing with employment law cases, invade 
the province of the jury, evaluate the evidence in dispute, and 
dispose of cases by granting defense motions for summary 
judgment or judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 50 provides, in pertinent part: 
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard with 
respect to an issue and there is no legally sufficient 
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for 
that party with respect to that issue, the court may 
determine the issue against that party and may grant a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party 
with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the 
controlling law be maintained or defeated without a 
120. Id. at 922. 
121. 228 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2000). 
122. Id. at 932. 123. The Court made clear the obligation of trial courts to treat employment law 
cases the same as other civil cases: "[Wle have reiterated that trial courts should not 
treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact." Reeves, 120 S. 
Ct. at 2109 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted}. 
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favorable finding on that issue. 124 
Rule 56 provides, In pertinent part: 
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any 
time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or 
without supporting affidavits for a summ~ judgment in 
the party's favor upon all or any part thereof. 5 
Rule 56 further provides: "The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
Interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter oflaw." 126 
Rules 50 and 56 do not inform a federal judge as to how 
evidence should be evaluated in determining, for purposes of 
a Rule 50 motion, if there is a "legally sufficient evidentiary 
basis" 12' for a jury to fmd for a party, or, for purposes of a 
Rule 56 motion, if there is a "genuine issue as to any material 
fact" 128 in dispute between the parties. Reeves fills this gap 
with standards for review of evidence by a federal judge ruling 
on either a Rule 50 or Rule 56 motion. First, the Court held 
that "the standard for granting summary judgment 'mirrors' 
the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that 'the 
Inquiry under each is the same.""29 The Court then held that 
a trial judge: (1) "should review all of the evidence In the 
record,"130 (2) "must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the nonmoving party,"131 and (3) "may not make credibility 
determinations or weigh the evidence,"132 because "[c]redibility 
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the 
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 
functions, not those of ajudge." 133 In addition, the trial judge 
124. FED. R. CN. P. 50(a)(l). 
125. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
126. FED. R. CN. P. 56(c). 
127. FED. R. CN. P. 50(a)(l). 
128. FED. R. CN. P. 56(c). 
129. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2110. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
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"must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party 
that the jury is not required to believe," 134 and "should give 
credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as 
that evidence supporting the moving party that is 
uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that 
that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses."'" 
The Fifth Circuit did not comply with these requirements 
because it "disregarded critical evidence favorable to 
[Reeves]-namely the evidence supporting petitioner's prtma 
facie case and undermining respondent's nondiscriminatory 
explanation."136 The court "failed to draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of [Reeves]"137 and "impermissibly 
substituted its judgment concerning the weight of the 
evidence for the jury's."138 Therefore, it was error for the court 
of appeals to overturn the jury verdict for Reeves. "Given that 
petitioner established a prima facie case of discrimination, 
introduced enough evidence for the jury to reject respondent's 
explanation, and produced additional evidence of age-based 
animus, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that 
respondent had intentionally discriminated."
139 
In both its pretext-plus and procedural holdings, Reeves 
will have a significant impact on employment law litigation. 
The predictable results will be more cases reaching juries and 
more cases settling prior to trial. 
IV. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE ADEA 
- Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents 
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents140 is the latest in a series 
of Supreme Court decisions that focus on state sovereign 
immunity from law suits brought by private parties, based 
upon the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 
related principles of sovereign immunity. The Eleventh 
Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United 
134. Id. 
135. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
136. Id. at 2111. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 2112. 
140. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
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States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State."1' 1 In Kimel, the Court concluded that 
Congress exceeded its authority under the Constitution when 
it amended the ADEA to provide for law suits brought by 
private individuals against the states. 
The story told by the Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity cases begins in Georgia in 1793, with the federal 
district court case that led to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Chisolm v. Georgia. 142 Chisolm was based on the text of 
Article III, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution which provides, 
in relevant part, "The Judicial Power shall extend to 
Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another 
State ... "143 The Supreme Court applied this text literally in 
Chisolm, an action of assumpsit brought by Chisolm, a 
creditor, against the State of Georgia. The political result was 
ratification in 1 798 of the Eleventh Amendment. Although 
the text of the Eleventh Amendment applies only to suits 
brought against one state by citizens of another state (as in 
Chisolm), the Supreme Court held in 1890, that the principles 
of state sovereign immunity reflected in the Eleventh 
Amendment also shield a state from law suits brought by 
citizens of the same state. 144 The Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity shield, against actions by private 
individuals, was lowered somewhat in 1908. In Ex Parte 
Young, 145 the Court permitted actions against state officials, 
sued in their official capacities for injunctive and declaratory 
relief, but this did not permit actions against state officials if 
retroactive money damages were sought. 146 
Soon after Title VII was amended in 1972 to include 
states as defendants, with potential liability to private 
individuals for money damages, the Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity shield was used by the State of 
Connecticut to defend against a Title VII s~x discrimination 
141. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
142. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
143. U.S. CONST. Art. Ill,§ 2. 
144. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890). 
145. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
146. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
y, 
I 
I 
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action brought by retired state employees. The case, 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 147 reached the Supreme Court in 1976 
and resulted in an opinion for the Court by then Justice 
Rehnquist. The Court concluded that the 1972 amendments, 
which extended Title VII to the states, were based upon an 
exercise of pbwer by Congress under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which gives Congress "power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article." 148 The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause, which provides that "No State shall ... deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws," 149 provides protection from sex discrimination by a 
state, and the 1972 amendments to Title VII provided a 
statutory remedy for this constitutional violation. The Court 
concluded "that the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of 
state sovereignty which it embodies are necessarily limited by 
the enforcement provisions of Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 150 Therefore, "Congress may, in determining 
what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing 
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for 
private suits against States or state officials which are 
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts."
151 
The Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of the 
states was considered again by the Court in 1989, in 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co."2 Congress enacted legislation 
that provided for suits by private individuals against states to 
force states to pay part of the cost of environmental clean-
up. The legislation was based upon the power of Congress 
under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution,"' and 
not Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although there 
was no majority opinion, the Court decided that Congress 
had the power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of unconsenting 
states, because the states consented to abrogation in advance 
147. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 1. 
150. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (citation omitted). 
151. Id. 
152. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
153. U.S. CONST. art. l, § 8, cl. 3. 
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when they ratified the Constitution (containing the Commerce 
Clause) in 1 798. 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas was overruled, in 1996, by 
Seminole Iribe of Florida v. Florida, 154 a case that dealt with 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988.155 This Act 
provided for law suits in federal court brought by Indian 
tribes against states. Congress enacted the legislation under 
the Indian Commerce Clause, 155 not Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In Seminole Iribe, the Court 
focused on two questions, first, whether Congress intended to 
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of the 
states and, second, whether Congress had the power to do so 
under the Indian Commerce Clause. The Court concluded 
that "Congress has . . . provided an 'umnistakably clear' 
statement of its intent to abrogate." 157 The Court then held 
that Congress lacked the power under Article I of the 
Constitution to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity of the states. The Court wrote: 
Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete 
law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh 
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits 
by private parties against unconsenting states. The 
Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under 
Article Ill, and Article 1 cannot be used to circumvent the 
constitutional limitations placed upon federal 
jurisdiction. 158 
A surprising development took place during the Court's 
October 1998 Term, in Alden v. Maine, 159 an action by state 
probation officers against the State of Maine alleging 
violations of the FLSA. Because the FLSA was enacted under 
Congress' Article I Commerce Clause power, Seminole llibe 
superficially seemed to control and provide the state with 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. However, all prior 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity cases involved 
litigation in federal court, and Alden was brought in a Maine 
154. 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996). 
155. Pub. L. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988), codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 
(1994). 
156. U.S. CONST. art. I.§ 8, cl. 3. 
157. SeminoleTribe,517U.S.at56. 
158. Id. at 72-3 (citation omitted). 
159. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). See supra notes 70-72 and acompanying text. 
ll-1 
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state court. For Maine to prevail, it was necessary for 
principles of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to 
provide protection when cut completely away from Eleventh 
Amendment textual moorings, because Alden was an action 
by citizens against their own state, not another state, and the 
jurisdiction of state courts, not federal courts, was at issue. 
Undaunted by this lack of textual support in the 
Constitution, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, "In light 
of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the 
Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from 
private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the 
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation." 160 
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and 
Stevens, wrote a strong dissent disagreeing with the 
majority's view of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 
He wrote 'The Court's rationale for today's holding based on a 
conception of sovereign immunity as somehow fundamental 
to sovereignty or inherent in statehood fails for the lack of 
any substantial support for such a conception in the thinking 
of the founding era." 161 The modem day implications of the 
majority's sovereign immunity doctrice were described by 
Justice Souter as follows, "The Court's federalism ignores the 
accepted authority of Congress to bind States under the FLSA 
and to provide for enforcement of federal rights in state court. 
The Court's history simply disparages the capacity of the 
Constitution to order relationships in a Republic that has 
changed since the founding." 162 
The October 1999 Term also produced Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings 
Bank, 163 and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board.164 In each case the 
Court held that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity 
doctrine shields states from private law suits based upon 
statutes enacted by Congress under its Commerce Clause 
powers (and, in the case of Florida Prepaid, the Patent 
160. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754. 
161. Id at 798 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
162. Id. at 761. 
163. 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
164. 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
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Clause), 165 as opposed to its power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Based upon the cases discussed above, the test for 
determining if a state is subject to federal claim litigation 
brought by private parties, either in federal or state court, is 
whether the underlying legislation was enacted by Congress 
as a legitimate exercise of its power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The key to determining if there was 
a legitimate exercise of Section 5 power is a 1997 case, City of 
Boerne v. F1ores. 166 City of Boerne was the basis for the 
outcome in Kimel, and will determine the outcome during the 
October 2000 term in Garrett v. Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama, 167 an Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity case that raises issues similar to those in Kimel, 
but under the ADA rather than the ADEA. 
City of Boerne evaluated the constitutionality of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).168 RFRA 
was enacted by Congress in response to Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 169 in 
which the Court held that the Free Exercise of Religion 
Clause of the First Amendment170 is not violated by a "valid 
and neutral law of general applicability,"m even though the 
law may have the effect of interfering with the free exercise of 
religion. RFRA replaced this permissive constitutional 
standard and "prohibits '[g]overmnent' from 'substantially 
burden[ing]' a person's exercise of n;ligion even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability unless the 
govermnent can demonstrate the burden '(l) is in furtherance 
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling govermnental 
interest. •u 172 
In enacting RFRA, Congress relied upon its powers under 
165. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. 
166. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
167. 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000). 
168. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb · 
1 to 4 (1994)). 
169. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
170. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
171. Smith. 494 U.S. at 879. 
172. City ofBoeme, 521 U.S. at 515-6. 
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Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against 
violations of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment. The problem, however, was that very little 
governmental action subject to the RFRA violated the Free 
Exercise Clause, as the Clause was interpreted in Smith. The 
City of Boerne Court held that for an exercise of Section 5 
powers by Congress to be valid, "[t]here must be a 
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be 
prevented and remedied and the means adopted to that 
end." 173 This test distinguishes "between measures that 
remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures 
that make a substantive change in the governing law ... "174 
Congress may enact legislation under Section 5 to prevent 
and remedy Fourteenth Amendment violations, but may not 
enact legislation that, as expressed by the Court, "decree[s] 
the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on 
the States. "175 
In Kimel, the Court concluded that the intent of Congress 
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of 
the states was clear. 1" It then considered the crucial 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity question, whether 
the ADEA is based upon an exercise of power by Congress 
under the Commerce Clause or an exercise of power by 
Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. If 
the former, then Congress exceeded its powers177 • If the 
latter, and the congruence and proportionality test of City of 
Boerne is satisfied, then Congress acted within its powers and 
validly abrogated the states' sovereign immunity from ADEA 
173. Id. at 520. The Court elaborated, "(T]here must be a congruence between the 
means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial measures 
must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measur_es appropriate to 
address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another." Id. at 530 (citation 
omitted). Later in the opinion, the Court wrote, "Remedial legislation under Section 
5 should be adapted to fue mischief and wrong which the [Fourteenth! [AJmendment 
was intended to provide against." Id, at 532 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted}. 
174. Id.at519. 
175. Id. 
176. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 75-76. 
177. Id. at 79. ("Under our firmly established precedent then, if the ADEA rests 
solely on Congress' Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases 
cannot maintain their suits against their state employers."). 
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law suits brought by private individuals. 178 
The Court considered whether or not the ADEA could be 
justified as an exercise of power by Congress under Section 5. 
Unfortunately for Daniel Kimel and other plaintiffs in the two 
consolidated cases before the Court. the Court recognized 
that, under its prior decisions, age is not a suspect 
classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 179 Accordingly, the Court observed, 
"States may discriminate on the basis of age without 
offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification 
in question is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.""0 Age discrimination, however, may violate the 
ADEA even if it is rational. The purpose of the ADEA is to 
require that every employee or applicant for employment is 
evaluated on the basis of individual ability and performance. 
This is different from the Equal Protection Clause under 
which "a State may rely on age as a proxy for other qualities, 
abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the State's 
legitimate interests. The Constitution does not preclude 
reliance on such generalizations. That age proves to be an 
inaccurate proxy in any individual case is irrelevant.'' 181 
The Court stated that "Congress' power 'to enforce' the 
Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to 
deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting 
a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which 
is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text." 182 However, 
"the same language that serves as the basis for the 
178. Id. at 80. ("Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, does grant 
Congress the authority to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity ... Accordingly. 
the private petitioners in these cases may maintain their ADEA suits against the 
States of Alabama and Florida if, and only if, the ADEA is appropriate legislation 
under Section 5. "). 
179. The Court concluded in three prior cases that age is not a suspect 
classification. If the Court had decided otherwise, a state would be required to 
justify an age-based classification by proving that there is a compelling governmental 
interest seived by the classification, and that it was served by narrowly tailored 
means. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (involving mandatory 
retirement of state court judges at the age of 70); Massachusetts Ed. of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 301 {1976) (involving mandatory retirement of state police officers 
at the age of 50); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1973) (involving mandatory 
retirement of foreign service officers at age 60). 
180. KimeL 528 U.S. at 83. 
181. Id. at 84. 
182. Id. at 81. 
I 
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affirmative grant of congressional power also serves to limit 
that power." 183 The Court reviewed the legislative record, 
which confirmed that "Congress' extension of the Act to the 
States was an unwarranted response to a perhaps 
inconsequential problem."184 In the view of the Court, 
"Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination 
by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that 
rose to the level of constitutional violation." 185 The Court 
summarized its conclusion: 
Judged against the backdrop of our equal protection 
jurispru-dence, it is clear that the ADEA is so out of 
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object 
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed 
to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. The Act, through its 
broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating 
factor, prohibits substantially more state employment 
decisions and practices than would likely be held 
unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, 
rational basis standard. 186 
The Kimel dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices 
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter, objected strenuously to the 
judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity that, in this case, 
prevented the plaintiffs from suing their state employers for 
violating their rights under the ADEA. The dissent 
characterized the "judicial activism" of the majority as a 
"radical departure from the proper role of this Court ... "
187 
The impact of Kimel is mitigated, to some extent, because 
the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of the states 
has no impact on ADEA enforcement actions by the federal 
govemment. 1" On the other hand, the enforcement resources 
of the federal government are very limited, which is part of 
the reason why Congress designed the ADEA to be enforced, 
in large part, through private actions. The impact of Kimel 
also is limited because the Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 89. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 86 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
187. Id. at 99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
188. In EEOC v.Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), the Court held that Congress had 
the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the ADEA and make the ADEA 
applicable to the states. Wyoming supports ADEA enforcement actions against the 
states brought by the federal government. 
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immunity of the states is inaplicable to actions by private 
individuals "against a municipal corporation or other 
governmental entity which is not an arm of the state." 189 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity "bars suits against 
States but not lesser entities. "190 
As discussed earlier, the Court is about to decide Garrett, 
an ADA case raising Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity issues. If the Court does not distinguish the age 
discrimination claims in Kimel from the disability claims in 
Garrett, and does not find a basis in Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment for enactment of the ADA, the result 
will visit immense harm upon a particularly vulnerable group 
of people who are harmed by state violations of the ADA in 
many aspects of their lives, not just employment. 
V. FLSA AND PuBLIC EMPLOYEES' ACCRUED COMPENSATORY TIME 
-Christensen v. Harris County 
The Supreme Court addressed the Fair Labor Standards 
Act in Christensen v. Harris County. 191 The action was filed by 
127 deputy sheriffs employed by Harris County, Texas. Each 
deputy had individually agreed to accept compensatory time 
in lieu of cash compensation192 for overtime. 193 Since 1985, 
the FLSA has authorized state and local governments to pay 
compensatory time rather than monetary compensation for 
overtime work, if the government has an agreement to do so 
with the employees or their representative. 194 The statutory 
provision sets a maximum number of hours of compensatory 
time that may be accumulated. 195 Once the maximum is 
reached, the statute requires the employer to pay monetary 
compensation for overtime. 196 In addition, the statute requires 
payment for unused compensatory time upon employment 
189. Alden, 527 U.S. at 756. 
190. Id. 
191. 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000). 
192. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)[3)[A) (1994). 
193. Although the deputies were represented by an association, Texas law 
prohibited the county from bargaining with the association so individual agreements 
for compensatory time were necessary pursuant to the statute. See Moreau v. 
Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1993). 
194. 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(o)[l),(2) (1994). 
195. Id. § 207(o)[3)[A). 
196. Id.§ 207(o)[3)[A). 
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termination. 197 Because the county was concerned about its 
potential liability for large cash payments to employees 
leaving their jobs with large accumulations of compensatory 
time, it forced employees to use compensatory time once they 
had reached a specified accumulation below the statutory 
maximum.198 The county implemented the requirement over 
the objections of the employees despite an opinion letter from 
the Department of Labor advising the county that such a 
requirement was permissible under the statute only if the 
agreement with employees for compensatory time included 
such a provision. 
The employees filed suit alleging that the county's policy 
violated Section 207(o)(5) of the FLSA, which provides that 
employees who request to use accrued compensatory time 
shall be permitted to do so within a reasonable period unless 
it would unduly disrupt the operations of the employer. 199 
The employees argued that this provision specifies the 
exclusive procedure for utilization of compensatory time, 
absent agreement with the employees to another method. 
The district court agreed, 200 but the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit reversed.'01 The appellate majority found a 
default principle that the employer was free to set workplace 
rules unless the statute or an agreement with employees 
provided otherwise. Since the statute did not directly address 
the issue, the employer's policy stood. The court expressly 
rejected the contrary holding of the Eighth Circuit in Heaton 
v. Moore202 that banked compensatory time was the property 
of the employee, to be used as the employee chose so long as 
it did not unduly disrupt the operations of the employer. 
The case generated five opinions in the Supreme Court: a 
majority opinion, two concurrences and two dissents. Justice 
197. Id. § 207(o)(4). 
198. Employees were encouraged to use their time as they approached the 
maximum but if they did not, the supe:rvisor could schedule them to use their 
compensatory time involuntarily. Christensen, 120 S. Ct at 1659. 
199. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5) (1994). 
200. Moreau v. Harris County, 945 F.Supp. 1067 (S.D. Tex. 1996), rev'd, 158 F.3d 
241 (5th Cir. 1998}, aifd sub nom, Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655 
(2000). 
201. Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1998). aifd sub nom, 
Chrtstensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000). 
202. 43 F.3d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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Thomas wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices 
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter and, with the 
exception of one section, by Justice Scalia. 
The majority rejected the argument of the plaintiffs, 
supported by the Secretary of Labor, that the statute set forth 
the exclusive method for use of compensatory time. Rather 
the majority viewed the statute as a "minimal guarantee" that 
the employee would be able to use the compensatory time 
when requested. The interpretation urged by the employees 
would, according to the majority, "convert Section 
207(o)(3)(A)'s [maximum accrual limit] shield into a sword,"20' 
an argument made by the employer. Since the statute 
permits employers to decrease the number of hours an 
employee works, and to cash out accumulated compensatory 
time by paying the employee for each hour, the employer is 
also free to do both of these things at once by forcing an 
employee to use compensatory time. 
Section III of the majority opinion, which Justice Scalia 
expressly declined to join, held that opinion letters of 
administrative agencies are not entitled to Chevron 
deference.204 In Chevron, the Court held that courts must 
defer to administrative agency regulations which reasonably 
interpret an ambiguous statute. The majority concluded that 
opinion letters are not entitled to the same deference that 
Chevron commanded courts to afford to agency regulations. 
Furthermore, the majority read the. Secretary's regulation, 
which provided that the agreement between the employer and 
the employee "may include other provisions governing the 
preservation, use, or cashing out of compensatory time ... " 
as permissive, rather than mandatory.205 Like the court of 
appeals, the majority looked for an express prohibition on the 
employer's policy in the statute or regulations and found 
none. 
Justice Souter's brief concurrence agreed with the 
majority based on the assumption that the ,opinion does not 
prevent the Secretary from issuing a regulation prohibiting 
203. Christensen. 120 S. Ct. at 1661. 
204. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resomces Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984). 
205. Christensen. 120 S. Ct. at 1663, quoting 29 C.F.R. § 553.23(a)(2). 
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the conduct engaged in by the employer.20' Justice Scalia's 
concurrence disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the 
opinion letter was not entitled to Chevron deference and 
would further find that the Secretary's brief alone would be 
sufficient to require such deference.2°' Nevertheless, because 
he concluded that the Secretary's opinion was not a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute under Chevron, he 
joined the remainder of the majority opinion.2°' 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, 
dis-sented, reading the statutory amendments regarding 
compensatory time as permitting compensatory time in lieu of 
cash payments only pursuant to agreement with the 
employees. Based on this general rule, the dissenters 
concluded that compensatory time is permissible payment for 
overtime only on terms agreed to by the employees. Absent 
agreement on the method for using compensatory time, it can 
be used only in strict accordance with the statute. This 
burden on the employer, which the majority sought to avoid, 
is imposed by the statutory requirements for overtime pay. 
The employer concerned about employee use of compensatory 
time is free to cash out employees' compensatory time, seek 
an agreement with its employees to permit forced use of 
compensatory time, or hire more employees to avoid the 
overtime requirements, a primary initial purpose of the FLSA. 
Justice Stevens also noted that the Secretary of Labor's 
position was entitled to "respect" as "thoroughly considered 
and consistently observed."20' 
Justice Breyer's separate dissent, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg and agreed to by Justice Stevens in a footnote, 
focused on the Chevron deference issue. Unlike Justice 
Scalia, Justice Breyer argued that Skidmore
210 
deference, 
which directs courts to look for guidance to expert agency 
views even where they are not an "exercise of delegated 
lawmaking authority"211 survives Chevron. In Skidmore, the 
Court held that, in interpreting statutes, courts may give 
206. Id. at 1663 (Souter, J., concurring). 
207. Id. at 1664-65 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
208. Id. at 1665. 
209. 120 S. Ct. at 1667 (Stevens, J .. dissenting). 
210. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
211. Id. at 139-40. 
~ !Iii 
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weight to the views of administrative agencies expressed in 
forms other than regulations issued pursuant to delegated 
rulemaking authority, because such views are informed by 
the expertise of the agency. 212 Justice Breyer found the 
agency's position persuasive and reasonable regardless of 
whether Chevron or Skidmore was the appropriate framework 
for consideration of the agency's position and thus would 
have ruled for the employees.212 
This is the third time since the 1985 compensatory time 
amendments that the Supreme Court has addressed the 
scope of the FLSA overtinle provisions for public employees. 
In each case, the employees lost on the ultimate question, 
limiting their right to overtime compensation. 214 In Auer v. 
Robbins, however, the Court deferred to the Secretary's 
irlterpretation of the statutory exemption for administrators, 
executives and professionals."' The Court unanimously 
deferred both to a regulation and to the Secretary's 
interpretation of the regulation articulated in an amicus brief, 
stating that the interpretation was controlling unless it was 
either clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. 
The deference to the Secretary's interpretation, which favored 
the employer in Auer, is absent from the majority opinion in 
Christensen, even though the regulation seems at least open 
to the reading given by the Secretary. 
The Christensen decision appears driven by a concern for 
protecting state and local governments from federal 
regulation, and particularly from the financial impact of 
federal regulatory requirements, a concern which has led the 
Court in the last several years to strike down or limit federal 
212. The Court in Skidmore stated that such views do not have the "power to 
control" the courts but may have the "power to persuade." Id. at 140. 
213. Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1687-68 {Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia 
argued that Skidmore deference is an anachronism. He would defer under Chevron, 
or not at all. Id. at 1664 {Scalia, J., concurring). 
214. In Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22 (1993), the Court held that the 
employer did not have to enter into an agreement with' the employees' union 
representative in order to pay compensatory time in lieu of cash, where state law 
prohibited collective bargaining. Id. at 35. In Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), 
the Court held that the St. Louis police department did not have to pay overtime 
compensation to sergeants and a lieutenant because they were salaried employees 
exempt from the statute, despite a manual that "nominally'' subjected them to 
reductions in pay for disciplinary reasons and one instance of such a reduction. Id. 
at 458·59. 
215. 519 U.S, at 456·59. 
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regulation of state and local government in a number of 
cases.216 The employer's articulated rationale for its policy 
was financial, and its brief emphasized financial concerns. 
The majority stated, "Petitioner's position would convert 
Section 207(o)(3)(A)'s shield into a sword, forcing employers to 
pay cash compensation instead of providing compensatory 
time to employees who work overtime."217 Of course, the 
employer correctly argued that concern for the financial 
implications of imposing overtime requirements on public 
bodies motivated the compensatory provisions in the first 
instance, but the amendments strove to balance the 
employees' right to overtime compensation with the financial 
needs of the governmental unit. Where no union represents 
the employees for collective bargaining, the agreement with 
employees that is required to implement a compensatory time 
program is nothing more than notification to the employees 
and lack of express objection.21" Thus, mandating that the 
agreement incorporate any policy requiring employees to use 
accumulated compensatory time does not significantly 
interfere with employer efforts to limit financial liability. 
The issue of the scope of Chevron deference may have 
significance for other areas of employment law involving 
administrative agency regulations. The justices disagreed 
about the requisite level of deference due adlninistrative 
agency interpreta-tions of statutes which are contained in 
forms other than regulations issued pursuant to 
congressionally delegated authority. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
216. See, e.g .. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (discussed 
supra notes 176-90 and accompanying text); Vermont Agency of Natural Resources 
v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000) (discussed infra notes 280-84 and 
accompanying text); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(discussed supra notes 159-
62 and accompanying text); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)(discussed supra notes 163-65 and 
accompanying text); Gebser v. Lago lndep. Sch. Dist .. 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (limiting 
Uability of public school district under Title IX); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997) (discussed supra notes 166-75 and accompanying text): Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot constitutionally force 
officers of the state to enforce a federal regulatory scheme); Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v. Flortda, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (discussed supra notes 154-58 and accompanying 
text). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia. Kennedy, Thomas and O'Connor, 
in the majority in the instant case, consistently voted for states' rights in the cases 
set forth above with one exception, Justice O'Connor's dissenting vote in City of 
Boerne. 
217. Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1661. 
218. Id. at 1659 n.l. 
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and Justices Thomas, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter would 
give such interpretations only "respect" "to the extent" that 
they "have the 'power to persuade.'"219 The majority conceded, 
however, that in accordance with the earlier decision in Auer, 
the agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to 
deference where the Court finds the regulation ambiguous.220 
Justice Scalia would apply Chevron deference to any 
authoritative agency position, including a brief, so long as it 
is a "fair and considered judgment. "221 He would defer to the 
agency's interpretation of a statute or its own regulation, so 
long as the interpretation of the statute is reasonable.222 
Justices Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg appear to agree with 
Justice Scalia, although they contend that both levels of 
deference survive. Thus, it appears that, in accord with Auer, 
all nine justices would defer to a reasonable agency 
interpretation of an ambiguous regulation, while only four 
would defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of a statute 
that is not contained in a regulation. The issues of whether a 
regulation is ambiguous and whether it is a reasonable 
interpretation of a statute leave substantial room for debate 
in any given case. This ongoing debate about the level of 
deference due to agency action is likely to continue and 
Christensen does little to clarify the standard. Indeed, by 
limiting Auer to ambiguous regulations, it may muddy the 
waters further. 
VI. ERISA AND HMO MIXED ELIGIBILITY AND TREATMENT 
DECISIONS- Pegram v. Herdrich 
In Pegram v. Herdrich, 223 a case much touted by the 
media,224 the Court decided unanimously that an HMO may 
not be sued for breach of fiduciary duty based on the 
existence of financial incentives which paid bonuses to the 
doctor-owners at year's end, encouraging them to make 
coverage and treatment decisions that minimized costs to the 
219. 120 S. Ct. at 1663. 
220. Id. at 1663. 
221 Id. at 1665 (Scalia, J., Concurring). 
222. Id. 
223. 120 S.Ct. 2143 (2000). 
224. This discussion of the case benefitted from the American Bar Association 
Teleconference, The Supreme Court Speaks: Herdrich v. Pegram, June 30, 2000. 
• T 
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HMO. The plaintiff, Cynthia Herdrich, visited an HMO doctor 
who, after discovering an inflamed mass in her abdomen, 
required her to wait eight days for an ultrasound to be 
performed at an HMO facility 50 miles away. During the 
wait, her appendix ruptured and she suffered from 
peritonitis, causing severe infection and requiring 
hospitalization. She filed an action for malpractice and 
several state law fraud claims. She won the former at trial 
while the latter were found preempted by ERISA after removal 
to federal court. She then amended her complaint to allege a 
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. The ERISA count was 
dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court, fmding that the HMO acted as a fiduciary under ERISA 
in making decisions about claims, referrals, and the nature, 
duration and location of treatment.225 While disclaiming 
intent to find that incentives automatically breach fiduciary 
duty, the panel majority concluded that the plaintiffs 
allegations, that the particular incentive structure breached 
the fiduciary duty to act solely in the interest of participants 
and beneficiaries of the fund by encouraging physicians to 
delay or withhold treatment to increase their bonuses, 
adequately stated a claim under ERISA. 
Judge Flaum, dissenting, argued that a mere structural 
incentive to deny care does not state a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty. He suggested that the market incentives to the 
contrary provide adequate protection and that judicial 
determinations about permissible levels of incentives are 
"unnecessary and ill-advised."22' Judge Flaum suggested that 
such incentives might support a claim where there was a 
breakdown in the market or negotiating process such that the 
incentives were not the result of a fair bargain between the 
HMO and the plan sponsor and beneficiaries, or where there 
was nondisclosure of the incentive. 221 
The opinion by Justice Souter began with a discussion of 
225. 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998). rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000). 
226. Id. at 383 (Flaum, J .. dissenting). 
227. A petition for rehearing en bane was denied over a dissent authored by Judge 
Easterbrook. 170 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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the differences between traditional fee for service and 
managed care, noting that managed care was designed to 
remove the incentive to provide unnecessary treatment to 
increase physician income. Justice Souter then pointed out 
that managed care inherently includes incentives to ration 
treatment and that any judgment about the legality of such 
incentives necessarily required the court to make a judgment 
about "socially acceptable medical risk,"228 a task better left to 
the legislature. The plaintiff challenged the particular 
structure of the HMO. Under that structure, the physicians 
with discretion to determine the medical necessity of 
treatment under the plan had a direct financial incentive to 
deny treatment or to provide it through HMO facilities 
because, as owners of the HMO, they received bonuses from 
minimizing treatment.'" The Court rejected the plaintiffs 
attempt to narrow the legal challenge and, having assumed 
that the plaintiffs argument would require all similar HMO 
decisions to be subjected to fiduciary duty standards 
regardless of the structure of the HMO, the Court necessarily 
concluded that the complaint stated no cause of action. 230 To 
reach that decision the Court first analyzed the statutory 
definition of fiduciary. 
Under the statute, a fiduciary is a person who manages, 
administers or advises financially an ERISA plan, exercising 
discretionary authority."' The Court indicated that a 
fiduciary under ERISA is permitted to wear "two hats."232 For 
example, an employer may be' a plan sponsor and 
administrator. When an employer is acting as plan 
administrator making discretionary decisions, it must act 
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries of 
the plan233 but when acting as the employer of the 
228. Pegram. 120 S. Ct. at 2150. 
229. Id. at 2147 & n.3. 
230. Id. at2150·5L 
231. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2l)(A) (1994). 
232. Pegram. 120 S. Ct. at 2152. 
233. ln Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996), the Court found that an 
employer was acting as plan administrator and fiduciary when it convinced 
employees to change employers, assuring them that their benefits would be 
maintained, despite knowledge of the precarious financial condition of the new 
company. Thus, the employer was liable for breach of fiduciary duty to the 
employees, who lost benefits as a result of the change. 
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participants and beneficiaries, no such requirement attaches. 
Like an employer, the doctors at the HMO wore two hats -
they made both treatment decisions, in which they did not 
act as ERISA fiduciaries, and eligibility decisions, in which 
they did. But as the Court noted, the two types of decisions 
were inextricably intertwined. 
The Court proclaimed some difficulty in determining 
precisely what the plaintiff alleged in her complaint as a 
breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the HMO. Ultimately, 
the Court concluded that the plaintiff was challenging 
determinations as to whether treatments were medically 
necessary, which the Court characterized as a "miXed 
eligibility decision."234 According to the Court, Congress did 
not intend such decisions to be fiduciary decisions under 
ERISA. Congress' focus was on financial decisions by plan 
trustees. Moreover, the Court foresaw dire consequences if 
such decisions were subject to fiduciary limitations. For 
profit HMOs would be eliminated because of incentives to 
limit costs, incentives which the Congress encouraged in 
enacting the HMO Act only one year before ERISA was 
passed. Nonprofit HMOs would also be at risk, threatening 
an "upheaval" in the health care industry which the Court did 
not want to initiate.235 The Court also reasoned that it would 
be difficult to articulate a rule that would not encourage HMO 
doctors to engage in the very practice HMOs were designed to 
eliminate, costly and unnecessary treatment of patients. And 
whatever the rule, the HMO's defense would be that the 
treatment offered was appropriate medical practice, 
transforming fiduciary actions into malpractice claims, 
providing little to the ERISA beneficiary except a deeper 
pocket for such actions. In addition, it would raise an issue 
as to whether ERISA preempts state malpractice claims. This 
parade of negative consequences con-vinced the Court that 
no cause of action was stated by the plaintiffs complaint.
236 
Physician incentives in HMOs have been widely criticized 
in both the popular and medical press. Had the Court ruled 
otherwise, it would have provided patients with an important 
234. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2155. 
235. Id. at 2156. 
236. Id. at 2157. 
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vehicle for suing HMOs for denying or refusing to pay for 
treatment. Interestingly, the ERISA allegations in Herdrich's 
case were triggered by the HMO's preemption defense to 
Herdrich's original state law fraud claims. The defendant 
removed the original action to federal court based on its 
claimed fiduciary status under ERISA.237 When the plaintiff 
amended the complaint to allege a breach of fiduciary duty, 
defendant argued that it was not a fiduciary for purposes of 
the allegations made by the plaintiff. The Court rejected the 
plaintiffs estoppel argument.238 
Now plaintiffs must rely on Congress to enact legislation 
allowing patients to sue HMOs,239 or on the growing trend in 
state courts to allow suits against HMOs despite ERISA 
preemption arguments.240 While Varity v. Howe gave some 
hope to participants that actions for breach of fiduciary duty 
might provide recovery for individual losses by fmding that an 
employer making representations to employees about the 
plan acted as plan administrator and thus as fiduciary rather 
than employer, 241 Pegram bars such actions, at least where 
the challenge is to medical necessity determinations by the 
HMO. Prior to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Pegram, the 
Eighth Circuit permitted a suit for breach of fiduciary duty 
against an HMO for failure to disclose physician incentives,242 
but the Supreme Court construed Herdrich's claim to 
237. Id. at 2154 n.8. 
238. Id. 
239. Legislation addressing the relationship of HMOs and ERISA is currently 
pending in both the House and the Senate. See H.R. 2990, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., 
145 Cong. Rec. H9523·01 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1999): S. 1344, 106th Cong. 1st Sess., 
145 Cong. Rec. S8623 (daily ed. July 15, 1999) (bill passed as amended); 106th 
Congress, 1st Session, 145 Cong Rec S 12728 (daily ed. October 15, 1999) (vitiating 
previous passage and postponing indefinitely by unanimous consent); H.R.Res. 348, 
106th Cong., 1st Sess., 145 Cong Rec. Hl 1341 (daily ed. Nov . 2, 1999) (House 
disagrees with Senate amendment to H.R. 2990 and agrees to conference). A major 
area of disagreement has been whether to provide individuals with the right to sue 
HMOs. See Suzanne Carter, Recent Legislation: Health Care and ERISA, 36 HARV. J. 
LEGIS. 561, 561 (1999); Michael E. Ginsburg, Recent Legisla~on: HMO Grievance 
Processes, 37 HARV. J. LEGIS. 237, 237 (2000); Harvey Berkman, New Suits Preempt 
HMO Move by House, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18, 1999, at Al. 
240. For discussion of the preemption issue as it relates to state tort claims, see 
Stephen F. Befort & Christopher J. Kopka, The Sounds of Silence: The Libertarian 
Ethos of ERISA Preemption, 52 FLA. L. REv.l (2000); Dawn Lauren Morris, ERJSA 
Preemption, HMOs and Denial of Bene.fit Claims, 59 LA. L. REV. 961 (1999}. 
241. See supra note 232. 
242. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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challenge the provision of the incentives rather than the lack 
of disclosure. 243 Employer advocates have expressed concern 
about the plethora of class actions against HMOs based on 
allegations of failure to disclose incentives. 244 The decision in 
Pegram did not assuage the concern. leaving open the 
possibility that an HMO is a fiduciary with respect to plan 
administration and thus has a duty to disclose incentives. 245 
Nor does it indicate which other types of decisions by HMOs 
might be subject to fiduciary requirements under ERISA.246 
The implications of Pegram for ERISA preemption are yet 
to be determined. Just a week after the decision in Pegram, 
the Court granted certiorart and vacated and remanded an 
ERISA preemption decision to the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania for reconsideration in light of Pegram. 247 In that 
case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had concluded that 
ERISA did not preempt a state law negligence action against 
an HM0.248 The court read the Supreme Court's recent 
preemption jurisprudence as narrowing the class of cases in 
which ERISA preempts state law claims.249 Notably, in 
Pegram, the Court acknowledged the narrowing shift in 
preemption law but suggested that the state and alleged 
federal law claims in Pegram were sufficiently close to raise a 
substantial preemption question which could be avoided by 
finding no federal cause of action. 250 
The HMO in the Pennsylvania case was sued for denials 
and delays in authorizing necessary medical treatment for an 
emergency. The concurring justice reasoned that the 
decisions being challenged were "individual medical 
decisions" rather than plan administration decisions and 
thus not preempted.251 Given that the actions of the HMO 
243. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2154 n.8 
244. See William J. Kilberg, The Impending Collision Between HMOs and ERISA: 
Can Either Emerge Unscathed?, 25 EMP. REL. L.J. 1 {2000). 
245. See Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2154 n.8. 
246. For example, if the HMO uses a utilization review process with a board of 
doctors to determine whether treatment is medically necessary, are those decisions 
mixed decisions under Pegram or fiduciary decisions regarding plan administration? 
247. U. S. Healthcare Sys., Pa. v. Pennsylvania Hosp. Ins. Co., 120 S. Ct. 2686 
(2000). 
248. Pappas v. Asbel. 724 A.2d 889 (Pa.1998). 
249. Id. at 892-93. 
250. Pegram. 120 S. Ct. at 2158. 
251. 724 A.2d at 894-95 (Nigro, J., concurring). 
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were similar in Pegram and the Pennsylvania case, the 
Court's action vacating the decision fmding no preemption is 
curious. Pegram, however, casts doubt on the preemption 
analyses of some lower courts which made a distinction 
between claims relating to quality of care, which are not 
preempted, and those relating to quantity of care, which 
are.252 Instead, Pegram found a category of mixed decisions. 
The implication of this categorization for preemption is 
uncertain. 253 If the Pennsylvania preemption decision stands, 
Pegram may tum out to be a double-edged sword for HMOs, 
relieving them of ERISA liability but subjecting them to state 
negligence claims. 254 
VII. ERISA ACTIONS AGAINST NONFIDUCIARIES - Harris Trust 
and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. 
In Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith 
Barney, Inc., 255 the Court decided that ERISA allows a private 
action by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary against a 
nonfiduciary party in interest who participated in a 
prohibited transaction. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, a 
fiduciary trustee of Ameritech's Pension Trust, sued Salomon 
Smith Barney alleging that Salomon engaged in a prohibited 
transaction while serving as a broker-dealer to the trust. 
Salomon sold interests in motel properties to the trust 
through the trust's investment manager, a fiduciary. The 
interests, purchased by the plan for ·$21 million, ultimately 
252. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 
U.S. 1009 (1995). 
253. The delays in Pappas were caused by the HMO, not the treating doctor, 
raising the question of whether that distinguishes the case from Herdrich where the 
treating doctor was an owner of the HMO. 
254. The Court has granted certiorari in another case that deals with the scope of 
ERISA preemption. In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 989 P.2d 80 [Wash. 1999), cert. granted, 
120 S. Ct. 2687 (2000), the Washington Supreme Court held that a state law that 
revoked ERISA plan beneficiary designations in the event of divorce was not 
preempted by ERISA. The Court's decision in Egelhoff may provide some direction 
regarding the scope of preemption. Although the Court has narrowed the scope of 
preemption in recent years, consistent with its general approach to federalism 
issues, Egelhoff presents the Court with an issue of whether to preempt a state law 
that may directly affect administration of multistate plans. Absent preemption, 
multlstate plans may be subject to differing laws in different states, some of which 
may conflict with the ERISA requirement to administer the plan in accordance -with 
its terms. 
255. 120 S. Ct. 2180 (2000). 
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proved virtually worthless, and Harris sued Salomon to 
recover the money paid. The basis of the action was that 
Section 406(a) prohibited sales of property between the plan 
and parties in interest.256 Salomon moved for dismissal 
arguing that, even if the transaction was prohibited, ERISA 
authorized suit only against the fiduciary who caused the 
plan to enter into the prohibited transaction. The district 
court denied the motion"' but the Seventh Circuit reversed, 
holding that Section 406(a) applies only to the conduct of 
fiduciaries and, accordingly, no cause of action existed 
against a nonfiduciary. 258 The Seventh Circuit's view diverged 
from that of other circuits which had held that Section 
502(a)(3) authorized a civil suit against a nonfiduciary 
involved in a prohibited transaction. 259 
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Thomas, 
the Court agreed that Section 406(a) applied only to 
fiduciaries, but disagreed that Section 406(a) limited the 
causes of action available under Section 502(a)(3), a remedial 
provision that does not specify the defendants. Section 
502(a)(3) authorizes civil actions "by a participant, beneficiary 
or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates 
any provision of [ERISA Title I] or the terms of the plan, or (B) 
to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such 
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the 
terms of the plan. "260 Since the section does not limit the 
defendants, but rather allows appropriate equitable relief for 
an act or practice which violates ERISA, it permits a civil 
claim against a party in interest. While the Court did not 
consider itself restricted by the literal language of Section 
406(a), which specifies that a fiduciary shall not cause the 
256. 29 U.S.C. § JI06(a)[l)[A) (1994). states: "(a) Except as provided in section 
1108 of this title: (1) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to 
engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that ·such transaction 
constitutes a direct or indirect-(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property 
between the plan and a party in interest .. , {D} transfer to, or use by or for the 
benefit of, a parly in interest, of any assets of the plan .... " 
257. Hanis Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Bros., 20 Empl. Ben. Cas. (BNA) 1449 
(N.D.Ill. 1996), rev"d, 184 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 1999)., rev'd. 120 S. Ct. 2180 (2000). 
258. Harrts Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Bros., 184 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 1999), 
rev"d, 120 S. Ct 2180 (2000). 
259. See 120 S.Ct. at 2186 (citing cases and observing that "the Seventh Circuit 
departed from the uniform position" of the other circuits). 
260. Id. at 2187. quoting 29 U.S.C. § !132 (a)[3) (1994). 
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plan to engage in a prohibited transaction, it relied on other 
sections of the statute to confirm that Section 502(a)(3) 
authorized the action. Section 502(1) authorizes the Secretary 
of Labor to assess civil penalties against fiduciaries and other 
persons, and defines the penalties by reference to the amount 
ordered to be paid in a civil action brought by the Secretary 
under Section 502(a)(5). Since the wording of Sections 
502(a)(5) and (3) is similar, the Court reasoned that if the 
secretary could bring a civil action against a person other 
than a fiduciary, then the participants, beneficiaries and 
fiduciaries could also.2 " 1 
The Court analogized to the common law of trusts, which 
allows an action for recovery of property or disgorgement of 
proceeds and profits against a third person who has 
possession of trust property, even where that person was not 
the primary wrongdoer. The Court rejected various 
arguments of Salomon suggesting that an interpretation 
allowing a cause of action would discourage dealings with 
ERISA plans, or encourage parties to charge higher prices to 
plans to compensate for potential liability. Salomon also 
argued that recognizing the cause of action would allow 
imposition of liability on the innocent based on a law suit by 
the guilty fiduciary. The Court found the statutory language 
clear and refused to depart from the language based on 
arguments regarding either the legislative history or the 
consequences of its decision.2" 2 The Court did suggest that 
concerns about requiring parties engaged in transactions 
with plans to monitor complicity with ERISA's complex 
provision might influence judicial decisions regarding the 
circumstances under which liability should be imposed on 
nonfiduciaries.263 
While recovery from fiduciaries for prohibited 
transactions was always available, the decision provides 
another avenue for recovering plan assets lost through 
prohibited transactions. If the fiduciary. has insufficient 
assets or insurance, an action against the nonfiduciary 
involved in the transaction will now be available. What the 
261. Id. at 2188. 
262. Id. at 2191. 
263. Id. at 2190-91. 
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Court did not decide was the standard for imposition of 
liabili1y on nonfiduciaries. Whether liabili1y requires 
knowledge that the transaction is prohibited or some other 
level of knowledge is left for another day. 
VIII. NONEMPLOYMENT CASES WITH EMPLOYMENT LAW IMPACT-
Beck v. Prupis. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert 
Construction Co., and Vennont Agency of Natural Resources v. 
United States 
Increasingly, plaintiffs' attorneys are bringing actions on 
behalf of employees using vehicles other than traditional 
employment law. In Beck v. Prupis, 264 the Court 
substantially limited employees' abili1y to use RICO to 
challenge terminations. The plaintiff, Robert Beck, filed a 
RICO action against other officers and directors of a Florida 
insurance holding company after he was terminated, allegedly 
for reporting their fraudulent activi1y to insurance regulators. 
In addition to allegations of racketeering activi1y in 
connection with the fraud, Beck asserted that his termination 
violated RICO because it was done in furtherance of the 
defendant's conspiracy to violate RICO. The district court 
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the 
ground that employees terminated for threatening to report 
RICO activities or refusing to participate in them have no 
standing to sue for damages from the loss of employment. 265 
The Court of Appeals held that the statute required that the 
plaintiff be injured by an act of racketeering, not merely an 
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 266 
Lower courts had divided over whether persons injured 
by an overt act that was not itself racketeering activi1y, but 
that furthered the conspiracy, could sue under RIC0.267 The 
264. 120 S. Ct. 1608 (2000). 
265, Id. at 1612. 
266. Becks v. Prnpis, 162 F.3d 1090 (11th Cir. 1998). 
267. Compare Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert, 
denied. 508 U.S. 957 (1993); Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 
1991); Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d (9th Cir. 1990), cert. dented. 502 U.S. 
921 (1991), and Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990} 
with Khurana v. Innovative Healthcare Sys., Inc., 130 F3d 143 (5th Cir. 1997), 
vacated sub nom, Teel v. Khurana, 525 U.S. 979 (1998); Schiffels v. Kemper 
Financial Servs., Inc., 978 F.2d 344 {7th Cir. 1992); Shearing v. E.F. Hutton Group, 
L . 
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Supreme Court resolved the split in the circuits on this issue, 
siding with the Eleventh Circuit in Beck. Justice Thomas' 
opinion relied on the common law to interpret the statute. 
Since the well-settled common law at the time of RICO's 
enactment provided that a plaintiff could sue for civil 
conspiracy only if he or she was injured by a tortious act, the 
Court concluded that Congress must have intended RICO's 
conspiracy provisions to be interpreted in accord with the 
widely accepted common law.268 Since plaintiffs termination 
was not itself an act of racketeering as defined by the statute, 
plaintiff stated no claim under RICO. The plaintiff argued 
that such an interpretation would render meaningless the 
section of the statute under which the plaintiff sued, because 
racketeering activity would be actionable under other 
statutory sections. The Court responded that the section 
permitted the plaintiff to sue co-conspirators who might not 
have violated the substantive provisions individually. 269 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, dissented, 
disputing the majority's conclusion that the common law 
required the result reached. 270 Justice Stevens argued that 
the plain language of the statute supported plaintiffs claim 
and imposed no requirement that the overt act causing his 
injury be of any particular kind, other than an act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.2 ' 1 Further, he pointed out that 
racketeering activities themselves are not independently 
wrongful under RICO as the majority suggested, although 
they may be under other statutes, but only violate RICO if 
they transgress the specific prohibitions of Section 1962. In 
that event, they would be actionable under one of the other 
provisions of the statute. 272 
The Court's decision virtually eliminates RICO claims 
challenging terminations effectuated to allow continuation of 
Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989). 
268. 120 S. Ct. at 1614-15. 
269. Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful for a person to conspire to violate any of 
the provisions of the substantive subsections, 1962(a}, (b) and (c), which prohibit 
using a pattern of racketeering activity to establish, operate, acquire, control, or 
conduct an enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994). 
270. Justice Stevens factually distinguished each case cited by the majority from 
the case at bar. Beck, 120 S. Ct. at 1618-19 (Steven, J., dissenting). 
271. Id. at 1620. 
272. Id. at 1619-20. 
l : 
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conduct prohibited by RICO, e.g., use of a pattern of 
racketeering to operate an enterprise. Plaintiffs still may 
have a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy, or a statutory whistleblower's claim where such 
statutes exist and apply to the specific facts relating to the 
termination. In states where no such cause of action exists, 
such as New York,'73 or states where the action is limited, like 
Virginia, 274 plaintiffs may have no recourse. 
The Court decided two other nonemployment cases that 
have potential impact for employment law and employees. In 
a commercial arbitration case, Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bilt 
Harbert Construction Co., 275 the Court held that the Federal 
Arbitration Act's (FAA) venue provisions are permissive rather 
than mandatory. Thus, actions to confirm, vacate or modify 
an arbitration award may' be brought in the district in which 
the award was made, as provided by the FAA,276 or in any 
district that is proper under the general venue statute. 
Employment arbitration actions frequently are brought under 
the FAA, and the Court is currently considering Circuit City 
Stores v. Adams, 277 in which the issue is the scope of the 
exclusion for employment contracts contained in Section 1 of 
the FAA.278 The majority of circuit courts have read the 
exclusion for employment conracts in the FAA to apply only 
to contracts of employment of workers who are directly 
273. See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E. 2d 86 (N.Y. 1983) 
{declining , absent legislative action, to recognize a cause of action for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy based on termination for reporting illegal 
account manipulations which resulted in large bonuses for company officers}. 
274. See Dray v. New Market Poultry Prods., Inc., 518 S.E.2d 312 (Va. 1999) 
(finding no claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy for reporting 
adulterated products to government inspector as no generalized whistleblower claim 
in Virginia and the statute designed to prohibit distribution of adulterated poultry 
products gave no rights to the plaintiff, but instead was a governmental regulato:ty 
mechanism). 
275. 120 S. Ct. 1331 (2000). 
276. § u.s.c. §§ 9. 10, 11 (1994). 
277. 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2004 (2000). 
278. The FAA provision at issue states '"Commerce,' as herein defined, means 
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the 
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and 
another, or between any such Territo:ty and any State or foreign nation, or between 
the District of Columbia and any State or Territo:ty, or foreign nation, but nothing 
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
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engaged in the movement of goods or people in interestate 
commerce.279 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that all 
employment contracts are excluded from the coverage of the 
FAA. 280 If the Ninth Circuit's view prevails in the Supreme 
Court, arbitration agreements in employment contracts will 
be enforceable only under applicable state laws. If the Court 
in Circuit City follows the majority of circuits, however, and 
reads the employment contract exclusion narrowly, 
employees and employers may have a wider range of venue 
options in actions under the FAA to confirm, vacate or modify 
employment arbitration decisions. 
Vemwnt Agency of Natural Resources v. United States,281 
another nonemployment case, also has relevance for 
employees. In Vemwnt, an employee of a state agency sued 
the agency in a qui tam suit on behalf of the United States. 
The plaintiff alleged that the agency defrauded the federal 
government by requiring employees to report their hours of 
work on a federal project falsely, thereby increasing the 
federal money to which the agency was entitled.282 The 
federal False Claims Act'" allows a private person to bring a 
qui tam action against the false claimant on behalf of himself 
and the federal government to recover damages. The private 
relator receives a portion of the recovery, which varies 
depending on whether the government or the relator is the 
primary prosecuting authority. The Court held that a private 
relator has constitutional standing to. bring such an action, 
but that the statute does not sufficiently establish Congress' 
intent to include the states within the definition of persons 
against whom such actions may be brought.'84 Accordingly, 
the Court did not have to reach the issue of whether the 
279. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co .. 177 F.3d 1083. 1086 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(collecting cases). 
280. See Circuit City, 194 F.3d at 1071; Craft, 177 F.3d at 1094. 
281. 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000). 
282. See 162 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1998). 
283. 31 u.s.c. §§ 3729-33 (1994). 
284. The majority opinion was written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices 
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas and Breyer. Justice Ginsburg, concurring, 
read the Court's opinion as leaving open the question of whether states were persons 
under the statute when the suit is filed by the United States directly. 120 S. Ct. at 
1871 {Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, 
dissented, arguing that the term "person" included states. Id. at 1871 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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Eleventh Amendment barred such actions. The opinion 
further protects the states from liability and prevents state 
employees from bringing qui tam actions against their 
employer when it is engaged in defrauding the federal 
government in violation of the False Claims Act, the statute 
that gives rise to most qui tam actions.2" 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The October 1999 Term produced five employment law 
cases, compared to six in the October 1997 Term and eight in 
the October 1998 Term. The five 1999 Term cases impacted 
employment law doctrine in significant ways and revealed, 
beneath the surface, the traditional voting patterns of the 
three groups of Justices on the Court. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas continued to vote 
against employee interests unless constrained by precedent 
or clear statutory language. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, 
Souter, and Stevens continued to vote in a way that protected 
the statutory rights of employees, and Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor continued to vote in an unpredictable manner, with 
their alignments determining the outcome in some cases. 
Reeves is the most important employment law case of the 
October 1999 Term. In its substantive part, rejection of 
pretext-plus doctrine was a victory for employment law 
plaintiffs. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas joined a majority opinion that clarified Justice 
Scalia's opinion for the Court in Hicks. In Hicks, the 5/4 
decision of the Court made the task of employment law 
plaintiffs more difficult after a prtma facie case has been 
established and pretext has been proven. However, the 
pretext-plus doctrine later developed by some lower courts 
contradicted crucial language in Justice Scalia's opinion. The 
procedural aspects of Reeves, relating to trial court review of 
evidence for rulings on Rule 50 Motions for Judgment as a 
Matter of Law and Rule 56 Motions for Summary Judgment, 
do not reveal the traditional voting patterns of the three 
groups of Justices In employment law cases. However, the 
procedural aspects of Reeves apply to civil litigation in 
285. Id at 1858. 
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general, and not just to employment law cases. 
On the surface, Kimel focuses on broad issues of 
federalism and the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity 
of states. However, the Court could have viewed the case 
differently, as involving the power of Congress under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Commerce 
Clause. In enacting the ADEA, and later extending it to the 
states, Congress was prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination 
in employment, an Equal Protection Clause concern, and the 
Court's 1976 decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer provided a basis 
for upholding ADEA private actions against states. The 5/4 
breakdown in Kimel is telling, with Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas in the 
majority, and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens 
in dissent. 
Christensen required interpretation of the public 
employee compensatory time provisions of the FLSA. The 
Court's opinion favored state employers over state employees, 
and rejected a Labor Department opinion letter that 
supported the employees' position. Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg. and Stevens dissented, and the concurring opinion 
of Justice Souter had the apparent objective of limiting the 
reach of the majority opinion by Justice Thomas. 
On the surface, the Court's unanimous decision in 
Pegram v. Herdrich is a defeat for employees because the 
Court blocked breach of fiduciary duty actions by employees 
against HMOs for mixed eligibility and treatment decisions. 
However, Justice Souter's opinion for the Court also protects 
employees injured by the medical malpractice of HMOs 
because it avoids ERISA preemption of the medical 
malpractice actions employees now can bring in state and 
federal courts. 
The fifth case, Harris Trust, also resulted in a unanimous 
decision for the Court, with Justice Thomas writing the 
opinion. Unanimity may be explained by ,the fact that the 
decision benefits employers and employees by permitting 
pension plan fiduciaries, participants and beneficiaries to sue 
non-fiduciaries for ERISA violations. 
The 1997-1999 Term cases reflect the continuing 
importance on the Supreme Court docket of employment law 
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cases. There is an overall three year trend that favors 
employees. However, prediction of likely results in future 
cases requires consideration of the voting patterns, in 
employment law cases, of the three clearly identifiable groups 
of Justices. 
